Tomer Laor, Yossi Oren

Poster: LockedApart: Faster GPU Fingerprinting Through the Compute API

Cyber

WebGL offers website direct access to the GPU, allowing beautiful graphics. The direct hardware access offered by WebGL was also shown to...

Review:

This submission presents a timely and relevant investigation into the security implications of the newly introduced WebGPU API, specifically concernin...

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Stefan Gloor, Patrick Jattke, Kaveh Razavi

REFault: A Fault Injection Platform for Rowhammer Research on DDR5 Memory

Informatics

DDR5 is showing increased resistance to Rowhammer attacks compared to previous generations. The minimum hammer count (HCmin) is a metric to...

Review:

This paper presents REFault, a novel and timely fault injection platform designed to address a critical gap in Rowhammer research on DDR5 memory. The...

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Martin Heckel, Florian Adamsky

Flipper: Rowhammer on Steroids

Cyber

The density of memory cells in modern DRAM is so high that frequently accessing a memory row can flip bits in nearby rows. That effect is c...

Review:

This paper, titled "Flipper: Rowhammer on Steroids," presents a compelling advancement in Rowhammer research by introducing Flipper, an amplification...

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Tristan Hornetz, Michael Schwarz

PortPrint: Identifying Inaccessible Code with Port Contention

Cyber

In many real-world scenarios, being able to infer specific software versions or variations of cryptographic libraries is critical to mounti...

Review:

This paper, titled "PortPrint: Identifying Inaccessible Code with Port Contention," addresses a critical challenge in security research: inferring spe...

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Leon Trampert, Michael Schwarz

Hidden in Plain Sight: Scriptless Microarchitectural Attacks via TrueType Font Hinting

Cyber

Microarchitectural attacks threaten system security and privacy, especially if they can be mounted without native code execution. Recent re...

Review:

This paper introduces a significant new vector for microarchitectural attacks, expanding the landscape of "scriptless" side-channel vulnerabilities. B...

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Lucas Georget, Vincent Migliore, Vincent Nicomette, Arthur Villard, Frédéric Silvi

Poster: A microarchitectural signals analysis platform to craft Hardware Security Counters

Cyber

Detecting malicious software or hardware behavior during the operation of a computer system requires observables from one or more abstracti...

Review:

The submission, titled "Poster: A microarchitectural signals analysis platform to craft Hardware Security Counters," addresses a critical challenge in...

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Fabian van Rissenbeck, Amit Pravin Choudhari, Christian Rossow

Poster: Isolating PIM from OS Level Adversaries

Cyber

Review:

This poster proposes to address the critical challenge of "Isolating PIM from OS Level Adversaries," a topic of high relevance in contemporary system...

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Antoine Geimer, Mathéo Vergnolle, Frédéric Recoules, Lesly-Ann Daniel, Sébastien Bardin, Clémentine Maurice

Poster: Systematic Evaluation of Automated Tools for Side-Channel Vulnerability Detection in Cryptographic Libraries

Cryptography

To protect cryptographic implementations from side-channel vulnerabilities, developers must adopt constant-time programming practices. As...

Review:

This poster addresses a critical gap in the field of cryptographic security: the persistent presence of side-channel vulnerabilities despite the avail...

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Daan Vanoverloop, Andrés Sánchez, Victor Bullynck, Flavio Toffalini, Frank Piessens, Mathias Payer, Jo Van Bulck

Talk: Blurring Enclave Page Accesses in Space and Time with Compile-Time Instrumentation

Cyber

This talk overviews our recent work on TLBlur, a novel approach that leverages compiler instrumentation and the recent AEX-Notify hardware...

Review:

This talk outlines "TLBlur," a promising new approach to mitigating controlled-channel attacks against Intel SGX enclaves. The work leverages a novel...

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Jacqueline Henes, Marius Muench, David Oswald, Hany Ragab

Talk: Transient-execution attacks on the CHERI Morello platform

Informatics

CHERI (Capability Hardware Enhanced RISC Instructions) is a capability-based ISA extension providing spatial memory protection and compar...

Review:

The abstract for "Talk: Transient-execution attacks on the CHERI Morello platform" introduces a highly timely and critical area of research at the int...

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