András Lénárt

Franco’s Choice: The Reevaluation of Spain’s Neutrality and Non-Belligerence During the Second World War

Introduction

Franco’s choice: the reevaluation of spain’s neutrality and non-belligerence during the second world war. Explore Franco's Spain during WWII, reevaluating its shift from neutrality to non-belligerence, diplomatic ties with Axis and Allies, and Franco's strategic choices.

Abstract

General Francisco Franco established his dictatorship in Spain in 1939 after winning the Civil War fought against the democratic Republican government. The same year, the Second World War broke out. The Caudillo wanted his country to remain neutral, but Spain soon moved forward to the status of non-belligerence: Franco backed Mussolini and Hitler on the level of propaganda, and he also sent voluntary troops to help the Germans, although he also maintained relations with the Allies. Later, the country returned to the status of neutrality. The aim of my article is to highlight the main features of the Spanish attitude and the government’s diplomatic maneuvers between the Axis powers and the Allies, paying special attention to Franco’s possibilities and doubts.

Review

This article promises a compelling re-examination of Spain's highly complex and often contradictory foreign policy during the Second World War. The title, "Franco’s Choice," immediately signals an intent to delve beyond a mere chronological account, suggesting a focus on the agency, motivations, and strategic thinking of General Francisco Franco as he navigated the treacherous international landscape. The abstract clearly outlines the central trajectory: Spain's initial neutrality, its subsequent shift to non-belligerence with strong leanings towards the Axis (evidenced by propaganda and the Blue Division), and its eventual return to neutrality, all while pragmatically maintaining channels with the Allies. This period is critical for understanding both Spanish internal dynamics and the broader European geopolitical context of the time. The stated aim to highlight the "main features of the Spanish attitude and the government’s diplomatic maneuvers" is well-defined, and the emphasis on exploring "Franco’s possibilities and doubts" is particularly intriguing. This suggests a nuanced analysis that seeks to unpack the internal deliberations and external pressures that shaped Spain's evolving stance. Given the established scholarship on this topic, the article's strength will likely lie in its ability to offer a fresh interpretative framework or bring new archival insights to light, thereby genuinely "reevaluating" rather than simply recounting. The abstract effectively sets up the core tension inherent in Franco's strategy: an ideological affinity with the Axis balanced against a pragmatic need to avoid direct conflict and maintain essential relations with the Allied powers. Overall, this paper has the potential to be a significant contribution to the historiography of Spain and the Second World War. Its success will hinge on the depth of its analysis into the "choices" Franco made and the evidentiary basis for understanding his "possibilities and doubts." A thorough exploration of how these internal considerations translated into concrete diplomatic maneuvers and shifts in policy status would be highly valuable. If the article can move beyond descriptive analysis to offer a robust reinterpretation of the strategic rationale behind Spain's complex neutrality and non-belligerence, it will undoubtedly offer a more profound understanding of a pivotal moment in 20th-century European history.

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