Davide Falessi

On the Correct Reading of Metaphysics V 7, 1017a 34–35. The Logic Behind Aristotle’s Example of the Diagonal

Introduction

On the correct reading of metaphysics v 7, 1017a 34–35. The logic behind aristotle’s example of the diagonal. Clarifies Aristotle's Metaphysics V 7 example of the diagonal, resolving a dispute between Alexander/Bonitz and Aquinas/De Rijk. Argues for Alexander's interpretation.

Abstract

This paper aims to clarify the opposition between Alexander of Aphrodisias, followed by Hermann Bonitz on one side, and Thomas Aquinas, followed by Lambertus Marie de Rijk on the other, regarding the correct reading of an example proposed by Aristotle in Metaphysics V 7, 1017a 34–35, which involves the diagonal and its incommensurability with the side. The author aims to demonstrate that Aquinas’s interpretation (and De Rijk’s one) cannot be accepted and that we should follow Alexander of Aphrodisias and Bonitz.

Review

This paper addresses a highly specific, yet significant, point of contention in Aristotelian scholarship: the correct interpretation of *Metaphysics* V 7, 1017a 34–35. Focusing on Aristotle's example of the diagonal and its incommensurability, the author delves into a long-standing exegetical debate. The core of the problem is framed as an opposition between the readings proposed by Alexander of Aphrodisias and Hermann Bonitz on one side, and Thomas Aquinas and Lambertus Marie de Rijk on the other. By tackling such a precise textual difficulty, the paper aims to resolve a persistent ambiguity that has shaped our understanding of a key passage in Aristotle's foundational work. The methodology indicated by the abstract suggests a rigorous engagement with historical commentaries and a close examination of Aristotle's original text, coupled with an analysis of the "logic behind" the example. The author makes a very strong claim, intending to demonstrate unequivocally that the interpretation advanced by Aquinas and De Rijk "cannot be accepted," thereby advocating for the Alexander-Bonitz line of thought. This commitment to a decisive resolution of a complex interpretive problem speaks to a focused and potentially impactful scholarly endeavor. Such detailed philological and philosophical analysis is crucial for advancing our understanding of ancient philosophical texts and their inherent logical structures. Should the author successfully demonstrate their thesis, this paper promises to offer a crucial clarification for a specific passage in the *Metaphysics*, contributing to a more precise and accurate understanding of Aristotle's philosophical and logical thought in that context. The resolution of this interpretive crux, while seemingly narrow, can have broader implications for how scholars perceive Aristotle's use of mathematical examples in his philosophical arguments. It represents a valuable contribution to the field of ancient philosophy, particularly Aristotelian studies, by meticulously re-evaluating historical commentaries and bringing logical clarity to a debated text.

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