Suraj Prasad, Marcus Tomaino

Heterogeneity in Organizations

Introduction

Heterogeneity in organizations. Discover how organizational heterogeneity impacts mission structure. Learn why some orgs cohere and others face contested missions, balancing alignment with free-riding, using agency cases.

Abstract

We explain why some organizations cohere around a mission, with members having similar mission preferences, whereas other organizations allow their mission to be contested by members whose preferences differ. Like in earlier work, coherence aligns interests over missions. But in contrast to previous work, this alignment comes at the cost of lower motivation: when resources are scarce and when members care about similar missions there is a free riding problem. This tradeoff between mission alignment and free riding determines the optimal mission structure. We draw on several case studies of government agencies to support our theory.

Review

This paper presents a fascinating and counter-intuitive explanation for the varying degrees of mission coherence observed across organizations. Its central contribution lies in positing a novel trade-off: while mission alignment might intuitively seem beneficial, the authors argue it can paradoxically lead to lower motivation due to a free-riding problem, particularly when resources are scarce and member preferences are too similar. This mechanism, where the "cost" of alignment manifests as reduced individual effort, offers a fresh perspective that significantly contrasts with prevailing views that often emphasize the unmitigated benefits of shared vision. The application of this theory to government agencies through case studies suggests a practical and empirically grounded approach to understanding organizational design. Despite its compelling core argument, the abstract raises several conceptual questions that would benefit from further elaboration in the full manuscript. The nature of the "free-riding problem" in the context of shared mission preferences needs to be precisely defined. How does agreement on a mission translate into a disincentive for individual effort, and what specific types of effort or contributions are being free-ridden upon? Furthermore, the abstract mentions "lower motivation" without specifying its dimensions (e.g., intrinsic, extrinsic, task-specific, or general engagement). Clarifying these mechanisms and their empirical manifestations would strengthen the theoretical contribution. Additionally, while "optimal mission structure" is a key outcome, defining "optimal" (e.g., for organizational performance, member satisfaction, or societal impact) and the criteria for achieving it will be crucial. Overall, this paper tackles a fundamental tension in organizational theory with an innovative and thought-provoking argument. Its re-evaluation of mission coherence, introducing the hidden cost of free-riding, has the potential to significantly advance our understanding of organizational design, incentive structures, and leadership challenges, particularly in resource-constrained environments. While some conceptual refinement concerning the specific mechanisms of free-riding and motivation would enhance its clarity, the core insight is robust and highly relevant. This work promises to be a valuable addition to the literature on organizational heterogeneity and mission dynamics.

Full Text

Comments

You need to be logged in to post a comment.