Organizational Economics Workshop
Workers in problem solving teams- these are short term teams that are set up to generate ideas for improving a production process or a product- are often rewarded through group incentive pay. This is even though group incentives give worke...
Altruism drives many economic decisions. We explore the implications of altruistic preferences for the organization of family firms. Adapting Aghion and Tirole (1997), we compare the allocation of decision-making rights in family and non-f...
This paper studies a principal-agent problem of moral hazard, in which the outside option is stochastic. This renders the agent's participation decision random from the perspective of the principal. The participation cost is no longer defi...
We consider auctions/tenders for the procurement of goods and services in the setting where the potential contractors face ex-post risks that may lead to cost overruns. The contractors have limited access to credit and are protected by lim...
We consider tenders/auctions for the procurement of items that do not exist at the time of the tender. The cost of production is subject to ex-post shocks, i.e. cost overruns, which cannot be contracted away or insured at the time of tende...
A successful organization – or Broadway production – needs the right team. A potential issue is that incumbent workers in a team might have a lower marginal return of effort, reducing the incentive for them to invest relative to newcomers....
A common question in organizational economics is how does a bundle or index of managerial practices or characteristics impact on firm or employee level outcomes. The presence of complementarities is of particular interest but we argue shou...
We explain why some organizations cohere around a mission, with members having similar mission preferences, whereas other organizations allow their mission to be contested by members whose preferences differ. Like in earlier work, coherenc...
This paper characterises the impact of vertical integration on price equilibria and incentives to strategically withhold capacity in a wholesale electricity auction. A two-stage game is analysed where vertically integrated firms first decl...
By Sciaria
By Sciaria
By Sciaria
By Sciaria
By Sciaria
By Sciaria