Cláudia Toledo

Are There Really “Tragic Cases”?

Introduction

Are there really “tragic cases”?. Critical analysis of Atienza's "tragic cases" concept through Alexy's legal framework. It refutes claims of no correct answer or limited rationality, challenging the notion of tragic cases.

Abstract

The aim of this article is to critically analyze the concept of the tragic case proposed by Manuel Atienza, starting from the same basis – the work of Robert Alexy –, but reaching very different conclusions. In the light of the parameters presented by Alexy (correctness, rationality, legal argumentation, human rights), the inadmissibility of some of Atienza's central assertions about tragic cases is exposed (such as the absence of a correct answer, the limitation of legal rationality, the option for the lesser evil), as well as the unsustainability of the very notion of tragic cases itself.

Review

This article, titled "Are There Really 'Tragic Cases'?", presents a sharp critical analysis of Manuel Atienza's concept of the "tragic case." The authors set out to dismantle this notion by building upon the very intellectual foundations that Atienza himself utilizes—specifically, the work of Robert Alexy. Despite this shared starting point, the article promises to reach fundamentally different conclusions, arguing vigorously against the validity of Atienza's framework and the very notion of tragic cases. The methodology appears to involve a direct and systematic refutation of Atienza's central tenets through the lens of Alexy's established parameters. The abstract highlights key areas of contention, including Atienza's assertions regarding the absence of a correct answer in certain legal dilemmas, the inherent limitations of legal rationality, and the justification of opting for the "lesser evil." By rigorously applying Alexy's criteria of correctness, rationality, legal argumentation, and human rights, the article aims to expose the "inadmissibility" and "unsustainability" of Atienza's propositions, suggesting a systematic and well-structured challenge to his understanding of difficult legal cases. Overall, this article promises a significant and potentially provocative contribution to ongoing debates in legal theory, particularly concerning the limits of legal rationality and the nature of judicial decision-making in complex ethical scenarios. Should the authors successfully demonstrate the logical inconsistencies and practical implausibilities of Atienza’s tragic cases through Alexy’s robust framework, it would compel a reassessment of how legal systems handle seemingly intractable dilemmas. The title itself poses a direct and challenging question, indicating a robust and potentially influential intervention into a core discussion within contemporary legal philosophy.

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