Ali Nurdin, Said Ariyan, Ombi Romli

POLITICAL PARTIES AND PARLIAMENTARY SEAT REPLACEMENT: A COMPARATIVE STUDY ACROSS FIVE DEMOCRACIES

Introduction

Political parties and parliamentary seat replacement: a comparative study across five democracies. This comparative study analyzes political parties' influence on parliamentary seat replacement across 5 democracies. It reveals varying party control and advocates for transparent democratic reforms.

Abstract

The mechanism of interim replacement of parliamentarians constitutes a critical pillar of democratic representation, serving not only to ensure administrative continuity but also to reveal the extent of political parties’ influence over vacated legislative seats. This study conducts a cross-country comparative analysis of the role of political parties in interim replacement mechanisms (IRP) across five democracies: Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines, and the United States. Using a qualitative comparative approach complemented by a Systematic Literature Review (SLR) of 58 scholarly works, the research examines the legal frameworks, institutional arrangements, and accountability dimensions that shape IRP. Findings demonstrate that in Indonesia and the Philippines, party elites wield dominant authority under the open-list system, frequently marginalising constituent participation and consolidating internal party power. In Malaysia and Singapore, although by-elections are formally prescribed, institutional loopholes and discretionary powers enable parties or governments to delay or circumvent these mechanisms, thereby compromising electoral legitimacy. Conversely, the United States exhibits higher levels of public participation through mandated special elections, with temporary gubernatorial appointments remaining tightly constrained. These variations underscore that the influence of political parties in IRP is highly contingent on each country’s institutional design, electoral rules, and governance norms. The study highlights the normative and practical implications of these arrangements and advocates democratic reforms that enhance transparency, institutional checks, and participatory safeguards, particularly in systems where parties retain near-absolute control. By linking institutional design to representative accountability, the article provides actionable insights for policymakers, scholars, and democracy advocates striving to foster more inclusive, transparent, and resilient legislative governance.

Review

This study offers a timely and highly relevant cross-country comparative analysis into the often-overlooked mechanism of interim replacement of parliamentarians (IRP), examining the profound influence of political parties in these processes. By focusing on five diverse democracies—Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines, and the United States—the research effectively highlights how various legal frameworks, institutional arrangements, and accountability dimensions shape IRP. The use of a qualitative comparative approach, bolstered by a systematic literature review, provides a robust methodological foundation for dissecting complex political dynamics and their implications for democratic representation. The findings reveal significant variations in party influence and public participation across the selected countries. The study compellingly demonstrates how party elites in Indonesia and the Philippines, operating under open-list systems, exert dominant authority, often at the expense of constituent engagement and internal party consolidation. In contrast, Malaysia and Singapore, despite formally prescribing by-elections, exhibit institutional vulnerabilities that allow parties or governments to delay or bypass these mechanisms, thereby undermining electoral legitimacy. The United States stands out with its mandated special elections and constrained gubernatorial appointments, indicating higher levels of public participation. These distinct outcomes underscore the paper's central argument that the extent of political parties' influence in IRP is critically contingent upon the specific institutional design, electoral rules, and governance norms prevalent in each nation. The article makes a substantial contribution by linking institutional design directly to representative accountability, offering valuable normative and practical implications. Its advocacy for democratic reforms, particularly enhanced transparency, robust institutional checks, and participatory safeguards in systems where parties maintain significant control, resonates strongly with contemporary challenges to democratic governance. By providing actionable insights for policymakers, scholars, and democracy advocates, this research not only enriches our understanding of parliamentary continuity but also offers a crucial framework for fostering more inclusive, transparent, and resilient legislative systems globally.

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