Alejandro Farieta

La objeción de aristóteles a la teoría platónica de la reminiscencia

Introduction

La objeción de aristóteles a la teoría platónica de la reminiscencia. Aristóteles critica la teoría de la reminiscencia (anámnēsis) de Platón sobre la Paradoja del Menón. Propone la inducción, analizando la semántica y el descubrimiento.

Abstract

A continuación presentamos una interpretación de la crítica deAristóteles a la solución que ofrece Platón a la Paradoja del Menón. SegúnAristóteles, cuando Platón dice que se da la reminiscencia (anámnēsis),realmente lo que se da es inducción (epagōgê). Nuestra interpretación secentra en dos aspectos: (1) la crítica semántica, pues el uso que hace Platóndel término anámnēsis no es habitual; y (2) la teoría no es capaz de dar unaadecuada explicación del efectivo descubrimiento.DOI: 10.5294/pecu.2015.18.2.1

Review

This article, "La objeción de Aristóteles a la teoría platónica de la reminiscencia," offers a focused and compelling interpretation of Aristotle's critique of Plato's solution to Meno's Paradox. The author's central thesis posits that Aristotle fundamentally reinterprets what Plato terms *anámnēsis* (reminiscence) as *epagōgê* (induction), thereby providing a distinctly Aristotelian lens through which to understand Plato’s epistemological framework. This re-evaluation of a classic debate in ancient philosophy promises to illuminate the precise nature of the intellectual distinctions between these two foundational thinkers. The interpretation presented is notably structured around two key aspects. Firstly, the article explores a "semantic critique," arguing that Plato's application of the term *anámnēsis* deviates from its conventional usage, suggesting Aristotle's dissatisfaction with Plato's terminology and conceptual precision. Secondly, it delves into the "explanatory inadequacy" of Plato's theory, contending that it fails to sufficiently account for the actual, observable process of discovery. By dissecting these facets, the author provides a detailed framework for understanding Aristotle's challenge, moving beyond a superficial dismissal to a deep engagement with the philosophical underpinnings of Plato's theory. The article makes a valuable contribution to scholarship on ancient philosophy by re-examining the intellectual debt and divergence between Plato and Aristotle through a specific, yet highly significant, epistemological issue. Its emphasis on Aristotle's reinterpretation of Platonic reminiscence as induction is particularly insightful, offering a fresh perspective on how Aristotle might have understood and responded to his teacher's theories regarding knowledge acquisition. This work has the potential to foster further discussions on the nature of philosophical discovery and the historical evolution of epistemological concepts, solidifying its place as a significant contribution to the field.

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