Xinxin YAO, Fuling WANG

生物醫學道德增強何以剝奪了有德之人的本質？

Introduction

生物醫學道德增強何以剝奪了有德之人的本質？. 本文質疑生物醫學道德增強技術。它指出該技術因繞過反思與實踐，無法培養真正的美德與道德主體性，進而剝奪有德之人的本質，並探討其倫理困境與教育挑戰。

Abstract

LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract in English. Jason T. Eberl and Matilda Ajibola’s paper shifts the discussion of moral enhancement from abstract debates about moral permissibility and moral value to a cautious analysis of the feasibility, effectiveness, and potential risks of moral enhancement technology based on the current state of scientific research. This paper provides a response to the question of whether we can biotechnologically construct a morally better human: it is impossible for biomedical moral enhancement to shape a “virtuous person”, because it bypasses the reflection, practice, and struggle that are necessary for the cultivation of virtue and thus fails to fulfil the fundamental criterion for moral subjectivity. However, while traditional methods can help individuals acquire genuine and stable virtues, both biotechnological interventions and traditional education may face the same dilemma: the difficulty of truly accessing the internal structure of individual moral subjectivity while promoting external norms.

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