Sara De Vido, Sara Dal Monaco

Tutela dei lupi e principio di precauzione nel diritto internazionale e dell’Unione europea

Introduction

Tutela dei lupi e principio di precauzione nel diritto internazionale e dell’unione europea. Scopri la tutela dei lupi e il principio di precauzione nel diritto internazionale e UE. Analisi critica dell'approccio antropocentrico e dell'utilità economica degli animali.

Abstract

Partendo da casi studio, come il caso Tapiola relativo alla legislazione della tutela della fauna selvatica (in particolare del lupo), De Vido e Dal Monaco si interrogano su come si sia spostato – o possa spostarsi – l’approccio antropocentrico delle istituzioni europee, che ancora classificano gli animali in ragione della loro utilità economica: tutelare gli allevamenti – essi stessi fonte di sfruttamento e oppressione – a discapito della fauna selvatica.

Review

The article, "Tutela dei lupi e principio di precauzione nel diritto internazionale e dell’Unione europea," by De Vido and Dal Monaco, presents a timely and critical examination of wolf protection within the frameworks of international and European Union law. The authors embark on an inquiry into the application of the precautionary principle in this context, specifically challenging the prevailing anthropocentric paradigms that continue to shape institutional approaches. This piece appears to delve into a significant intersection of environmental law, animal welfare ethics, and legal policy, offering a crucial perspective on a contentious area of biodiversity conservation. Central to the authors' argument is a robust critique of how EU institutions classify animals primarily based on their economic utility, often prioritizing the protection of livestock at the expense of wild fauna. Through the lens of pertinent case studies, such as the Tapiola case related to wildlife protection legislation concerning wolves, De Vido and Dal Monaco scrutinize this anthropocentric bias. They provocatively suggest that livestock farming itself constitutes a 'source of exploitation and oppression,' thereby framing the conflict not merely as one between economic interest and conservation, but as a deeper ethical dilemma. The article's core strength lies in its exploration of how this entrenched perspective has shifted, or *could* shift, towards a more ecologically holistic view. This work offers a valuable contribution to ongoing scholarly and policy debates surrounding biodiversity conservation and animal rights within a legal context. By dissecting the limitations of current legislative frameworks and questioning their underlying philosophical assumptions, De Vido and Dal Monaco provide a compelling foundation for re-evaluating the role of the precautionary principle in wildlife management, particularly for keystone species like wolves. The article's bold stance against economic utility as the sole determinant of animal value, coupled with its focus on practical case studies, positions it as an essential read for legal scholars, policymakers, and environmental advocates seeking to advance more equitable and ecologically sound approaches to wildlife protection in Europe and beyond.

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