Jerzy Gaul

Polska racja stanu i legalizacja przez Józefa Piłsudskiego przewrotu majowego 1926

Introduction

Polska racja stanu i legalizacja przez józefa piłsudskiego przewrotu majowego 1926. Józef Piłsudski po przewrocie majowym 1926 zalegalizował swoje rządy. Artykuł analizuje kampanię, która przekonała Polskę i Europę Zachodnią o legalności nowego reżimu.

Abstract

THE POLISH REASON OF STATE AND THE LEGALIZATION OF THE MAY 1926 COUP D’ÉTAT BY JÓZEF PIŁSUDSKI Having unconstitutionally seized power in the military coup of May 1926, Józef Piłsudski lacked an immediate legal framework that legitimized his rule. This crisis of state not only raised the specter of civil war, but also raised doubts among the countries of Western Europe that Poland could continue as a bulwark of Western civilization and a barrier against Russia. In these circumstances, Józef Piłsudski launched a wide-ranging campaign that included high-ranking government ministers to convince the people of Poland and Western European governments of the legality of the new regime. The campaign was broadly successful. Having rejected the possibility of direct dictatorship in favor of representative government, Józef Piłsudski recognized the marshal of the Parliament, Maciej Rataj, as the interim president of Poland, rejected the idea of imposing military commissioners, and worked with Parliament to establish a new government, at the head of which sat Prime Minister Kazimierz Bartel. Józef Piłsudski himself assumed the portfolio of minister of military affairs after rejecting the National Assembly’s efforts to elect him president. All these steps convinced Polish society and many foreign governments that the regime established as a result of the coup of 1926 was legitimate.

Review

This paper, titled "The Polish Reason of State and the Legalization of the May 1926 Coup d’État by Józef Piłsudski," promises a compelling historical analysis of a pivotal moment in interwar Polish history. The abstract clearly outlines the central problem: Piłsudski's unconstitutional seizure of power and the subsequent necessity to legitimize his regime both domestically and internationally. It posits that Piłsudski, facing a "crisis of state" and international skepticism, launched a concerted campaign to secure the legality of the new order, ultimately succeeding by rejecting overt dictatorship in favor of a modified form of representative government. The abstract highlights several key aspects that make this study particularly interesting. It points to Piłsudski's strategic decision-making, such as recognizing Marshal Maciej Rataj, rejecting military commissioners, and forming a new government with Kazimierz Bartel, all of which contributed to the perception of legality. The dual focus of the legalization campaign—convincing both Polish society and Western European governments—is a crucial element that underscores the complex political landscape of the time. The paper's assertion that these steps "convinced Polish society and many foreign governments that the regime established as a result of the coup of 1926 was legitimate" presents a strong, actionable thesis for the full article. This analysis offers a valuable perspective on the practical challenges of consolidating power after an unconstitutional takeover, particularly in a nascent democracy under international scrutiny. While the abstract effectively summarizes the *outcomes* of Piłsudski's actions, the full paper would ideally delve into the *mechanisms* and *rhetoric* employed during this "wide-ranging campaign," as well as exploring the nuances of what "legitimate" meant to different stakeholders at the time. Such a study holds significant relevance not only for understanding interwar Poland but also for broader discussions on state legitimacy, coup aftermaths, and the concept of *raison d'état* in transitional political systems.

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