Roberto Navarro-Dolmestch

Inteligencia artificial como «actuante» en el derecho penal. Una primera aproximación

Introduction

Inteligencia artificial como «actuante» en el derecho penal. Una primera aproximación. Explora la IA como 'actuante' en derecho penal, analizando la autoría mediata. Propone la categoría 'actuantes' para dispositivos IA, redefiniendo la responsabilidad penal ante máquinas inteligentes.

Abstract

Este artículo analiza la aplicabilidad de la autoría mediata como título de imputación personal para la persona física que utiliza las capacidades técnicas de un dispositivo dotado de algoritmos de IA, adoptando una posición favorable. A propósito de dicho análisis, se introduce, como una primera aproximación, la categoría de los «actuantes» (conformada por tales dispositivos) que rompe el modelo conceptual bipartito del derecho penal moderno y que distingue solo «sujetos» y «objetos». Se propone que la categoría de los actuantes puede ser útil en la reinterpretación de las estructuras jurídico-penales en la tarea de abordar el problema de la responsabilidad penal por el involucramiento de máquinas inteligentes.

Review

This article presents a timely and highly relevant contribution to the nascent but critical field of artificial intelligence and criminal law. The authors tackle the complex issue of establishing criminal responsibility when AI-powered devices are involved, specifically focusing on the applicability of *autoría mediata* (indirect perpetration) for the human operator. Their favorable stance on this imputation model is thoroughly explored, providing a valuable starting point for legal scholars and practitioners grappling with these emerging challenges. The paper's most significant innovation lies in its bold introduction of the category of "actuantes" (actors/agents) for intelligent machines, proposing a fundamental re-evaluation of established criminal law paradigms. A key strength of this work is its willingness to challenge the entrenched conceptual framework of modern criminal law, which traditionally distinguishes only between "subjects" and "objects." By positing "actuantes" as a distinct third category, the authors offer a sophisticated analytical tool that moves beyond the limitations of existing frameworks in addressing the unique complexities posed by autonomous and semi-autonomous systems. This conceptual breakthrough is not merely theoretical; it provides a much-needed lens through which to reinterpret juridical-criminal structures, making the task of assigning personal imputation for human actors who leverage AI capabilities more coherent and legally sound. The paper thus demonstrates a profound understanding of both technological advancements and their deep implications for legal doctrine. While this "first approximation" admirably lays the groundwork for a new conceptual model, future research could fruitfully expand upon several aspects. It would be beneficial to delve deeper into the precise criteria and threshold for an AI device to be classified as an "actuante," considering the varying degrees of AI autonomy and intent-like behavior. Exploring the practical implications of integrating this category into different legal systems and examining potential interfaces with other forms of liability (e.g., negligence, corporate liability) would also enhance the framework's robustness. Nevertheless, this article serves as an excellent foundational piece, initiating a crucial dialogue and providing an insightful framework that promises to stimulate further scholarly debate and development in the evolving intersection of technology and criminal justice.

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