Lydia Deni Gamboa

La naturaleza de las proposiciones y las actitudes proposicionales según Guillermo de Ockham

Introduction

La naturaleza de las proposiciones y las actitudes proposicionales según guillermo de ockham. Analiza las dos teorías de Ockham sobre proposiciones y actitudes proposicionales. Compara su efectividad ante el realismo y su consistencia con juicios.

Abstract

Ockham propuso dos teorías consecutivas sobre la naturaleza de los conceptos comunes o universales. De manera paralela a estas dos teorías, Ockham propuso dos teorías sobre la naturaleza de las proposiciones. Este artículo tiene dos objetivos vinculados entre sí. En primer lugar, mostrar que la primera teoría de Ockham sobre la naturaleza de las proposiciones resuelve solo dos de los tres problemas que el realismo proposicional contemporáneo concibe en sus argumentos, mientras que la segunda teoría resuelve tres de estos problemas. En cada caso, sin embargo, Ockham atribuye las mismas características y funciones a las proposiciones que la literatura contemporánea. En segundo lugar, en este artículo tengo como objetivo mostrar que, al observar aquellas características y funciones de las proposiciones, es claro que las dos teorías sobre las proposiciones de Ockham son consistentes con una sola teoría sobre la naturaleza de los juicios, y las aprehensiones complejas, dos tipos diferentes de actitudes proposicionales.

Review

This article promises a rigorous and insightful examination of William of Ockham's evolving theories concerning the nature of propositions and their relationship to propositional attitudes. By drawing a parallel between Ockham's two consecutive theories on concepts and his two theories on propositions, the author sets the stage for a sophisticated analysis. The primary objectives are clearly laid out: first, to demonstrate the differential success of Ockham's two propositional theories in addressing problems posed by contemporary propositional realism, noting his surprising alignment with modern literature on propositional characteristics and functions; and second, to argue for the underlying consistency of these two propositional theories with a unified theory of judgments and complex apprehensions. This approach suggests a valuable contribution to both Ockham scholarship and the broader history of philosophy of language and mind. The article's strengths lie in its dual comparative approach. By not only contrasting Ockham's two theories against each other but also situating them within the framework of contemporary propositional realism, the author offers a fresh perspective on Ockham's intellectual development and his lasting relevance. The claim that Ockham's second theory resolves more contemporary problems while still attributing similar functions to propositions as modern thought is particularly intriguing, suggesting a profound historical continuity in philosophical inquiry. Furthermore, establishing the consistency of Ockham's two theories of propositions with a single, overarching theory of propositional attitudes — specifically judgments and complex apprehensions — promises to unify disparate aspects of his philosophical system, offering a more coherent and comprehensive understanding of his views on mental states and their content. Overall, this work appears poised to make a significant contribution to our understanding of Ockham's philosophy and its dialogue with contemporary debates. The detailed analysis of how Ockham's theories address specific problems within contemporary propositional realism, alongside the articulation of a consistent framework for his views on propositional attitudes, suggests a deeply researched and critically engaged piece. Scholars of medieval philosophy, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind will find this article valuable for its meticulous historical reconstruction, its capacity to bridge historical and contemporary philosophical concerns, and its potential to re-evaluate the sophistication and coherence of Ockham's thought.

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