Ruowen XIANG, Yue WANG

我們是否應當接受通過基因增強構建道德上更為完善的人類？

Introduction

我們是否應當接受通過基因增強構建道德上更為完善的人類？. 探討基因道德增強（GVP）的爭議。本文指出其與自主權衝突，在法律和政策上存在問題且不可行。強調道德教育優於生物科技手段。

Abstract

LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract in English. This commentary discusses the prospect of genetic moral enhancement, focusing on the moderate Genetic Virtue Project (GVP) articulated in “Can We Biotechnologically Construct a Morally Better Human?” While the GVP aims only to strengthen an individual’s natural receptivity to virtue acquisition, this commentary argues that from both legal and policy perspectives, this approach remains fundamentally problematic. Theoretically, it creates an irreconcilable conflict between parental reproductive autonomy and the future autonomy of the embryo, as irreversible genetic alterations preemptively undermine the very basis for an individual’s self- determination. Practically, its implementation is infeasible due to the legal principle of technological neutrality and the impossibility of legally establishing unified moral content. As modulating moral emotions cannot guarantee morally right action or motivation, the path to moral improvement must involve enhancing traditional moral education and social design rather than pursuing biotechnological shortcuts.

Review

This commentary provides a trenchant critique of the prospect of genetic moral enhancement, specifically targeting the moderate Genetic Virtue Project (GVP) which aims to strengthen an individual's natural receptivity to virtue acquisition. While acknowledging the GVP's ostensibly modest goal, the author forcefully argues that this biotechnological approach remains fundamentally problematic from various angles. The paper's core thesis is that pursuing genetic moral enhancement is not only fraught with profound theoretical and practical difficulties but also represents a misguided shortcut, diverting attention from more effective traditional pathways to moral improvement. The commentary develops its critique through a multi-faceted analysis. Theoretically, it posits an irreconcilable conflict between parental reproductive autonomy and the future autonomy of the embryo, asserting that irreversible genetic alterations preemptively undermine an individual’s self-determination – a critical ethical concern. Practically, the author identifies significant implementation hurdles, citing the legal principle of technological neutrality and the inherent impossibility of legally establishing unified moral content to guide such interventions. Furthermore, the paper rightly challenges the efficacy of such an approach, pointing out that modulating moral emotions does not guarantee morally right action or motivation, thus questioning the very premise of the GVP's proposed mechanism for improvement. Overall, this commentary offers a timely and robust intervention in the ongoing debate surrounding human enhancement. By meticulously dissecting the ethical, legal, and practical pitfalls of even a moderate approach to genetic moral enhancement, the author compellingly argues against biotechnological solutions in favor of strengthening traditional moral education and thoughtful social design. The paper's strength lies in its comprehensive rejection of the GVP, providing a critical counter-narrative that underscores the complexities and potential dangers of applying genetic technologies to deeply personal and societally defined concepts like morality. This work is highly valuable for scholars in bioethics, legal philosophy, and public policy, challenging them to re-evaluate the boundaries of human intervention and the true meaning of moral progress.

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