Dominik Jarczewski

Generous Virtues

Introduction

Generous virtues. Re-evaluate Virtue Epistemology's limits. This paper proposes Epistemic Social Environmentalism, a novel account for understanding intellectual and 'generous virtues,' including other-regarding traits.

Abstract

The classical Virtue Epistemology, one of the most interesting contributions of late 20th century American philosophy, proposed to analyze knowledge and epistemic evaluation in general in terms of intellectual virtues. In this approach, these virtues were understood as faculties or personal traits that contribute to the production of knowledge and other epistemic goods. However, the value of some plausible candidates for intellectual virtues, which can be called “generous virtues,” cannot be explained in those terms. This paper proposes a novel account of the general value of intellectual virtues that includes other‑regarding ones. To that end, it considers three strategies of socialization of Virtue Epistemology, and proposes original solution: Epistemic Social Environmentalism.

Review

This paper, titled "Generous Virtues," addresses a significant challenge within classical Virtue Epistemology. The abstract clearly identifies the prevailing understanding of intellectual virtues as faculties or traits contributing to knowledge production, a foundational concept from late 20th-century American philosophy. The core problem the paper highlights is that certain plausible candidates for intellectual virtues, termed "generous virtues," do not neatly fit this established explanatory framework regarding their value. This sets the stage for a critical re-evaluation of how intellectual virtues, particularly those with an other-regarding dimension, are conceptualized and valued within the epistemological landscape. To tackle this issue, the paper proposes a novel account of the general value of intellectual virtues that specifically accommodates these other-regarding virtues. The abstract outlines a structured approach to achieving this, first by considering "three strategies of socialization of Virtue Epistemology." This suggests a systematic engagement with existing attempts or proposals to broaden the scope of virtue epistemology. The paper then promises an "original solution" in the form of "Epistemic Social Environmentalism." This proposed framework appears to be the central theoretical contribution, aiming to provide a more inclusive and robust understanding of how virtues, including those with a social or relational aspect, contribute to epistemic goods. Overall, "Generous Virtues" presents itself as a timely and important contribution to contemporary epistemology. By identifying a significant lacuna in classical Virtue Epistemology and offering a new theoretical framework – Epistemic Social Environmentalism – the paper promises to significantly advance our understanding of intellectual virtues and their value, particularly in social and relational contexts. This re-orientation could open up new avenues for research into the interplay between individual intellectual traits and the broader epistemic environment, enriching the field beyond purely individualistic accounts of knowledge and evaluation.

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